1964

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

GENERAL

E 1073/55

FROM F.O. Minute
dft tel to Washington

SECRET

No.

Dated Jan 28.

Received Jan 29.

SUBJECT

Guide points arising from reports since the completion of briefs for Anglo-American talks on the Arab Summit and Jordan Waters.

References

E1022/3

Dept-3/2

MINUTES

Rm 4/2

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

dft) W'ton. 1362. 28/1

(Action completed)	(Main Indexed)
J. B Jones 4/2	91. 2/6

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(Date) 29/1/64

Despatched 3.58 pm

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(Date) 28.1.64

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29 JAN 1964
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Mr. Crawford.

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Following for Sir G.Harrison.

Your brief No.5(g) (Jordan Waters) & the Arab Summit

You may wish to bear in mind the following points arising from reports received since this brief was completed. They do not materially affect the Talking Points in the brief or the paper at Annex E.

2. Diversion of the Head Waters. Beirut telegram No.73 [of January 25] confirms that the Lebanese are not ready to begin diversion work for a long time and suggests that they may intend to conform to the Johnston Plan. Damascus telegram No.21 [of January 24] suggests that the Syrians will not be able to begin work soon. We have two reports that nothing will be done before the Unified Military Command is set up: this may well take time, since Amman telegram No.23 [of January 23] states that no detailed plans have been agreed and there is obvious room for prolonged dissension on these. These considerations strengthen the view that no early crisis

over/

(80728) Wt. 17714—35 200m 7/62 St.S.

over Arab diversionary works is likely.

3. Yarmuk. This project seems to have been ignored by the conference. This could mean (a) that the project is politically less controversial and (b) on the other hand, that it is less likely to appeal to Arab opinion as a counter to Israeli action than action on the northern head-waters.

4. Military Action. Damascus telegram no.21 does not exclude the possibility of Syrian military initiative but other posts report that the military command is solely intended for defence against Israel attack and confirm that no general military initiative is contemplated. Flag C

5. Jordan. It is clear that King Hussein returned from the Summit Meeting in a dangerously euphoric mood. He seems to have been swept off his feet by Nasser's attentions and by the prospects of a new era of unity in Inter-Arab relations, and to be looking forward to substantial expansion and re-equipment of his forces at Arab expense. We must reckon with the probability of a more uncooperative and thoroughly unrealistic attitude from him in the coming months, particularly on financial and austerity, with the possibility of some unconsidered moves which may weaken his position and alarm the Israelis (e.g. in connexion with the Palestine entity or the stationing of other Arab troops in Jordan).

6. Iraq. Baghdad telegram no.62 of January 24 indicates some strengthening of ties with the UAR to be probable. This will emphasise further the isolation of the Syrian Baath Govt which also appeared clearly at the Summit Meeting. Flag E

7. U.A.R. Heikal's Friday article of January 24 stressed the limited area to be irrigated by the Israel project, is a striking example of UAR anxiety to avoid a crisis on this issue. mid

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8. Saudi Arabia. The Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs ~~appears~~ was pleased with the results of the Conference ~~and confident~~ (Sir C. Cross reports that he clearly believes and he hopes that the royalist - republican leaders of a settlement in the Yemen. ~~He regards this as~~ might meet outside the [illegible]. He made it clear ~~a precondition for the reestablishment of diplo-~~ however that progress in the Yemen must precede the restoration matic relations with Cairo. We do not know how far OMAR SAQQAF reflects Faisal's views on these questions.

9. In general, the summit seems to have been a success for President Nasser. He ~~not only~~ got the Arab leaders to endorse what he wanted: i.e. a policy which involved the renunciation of military action and the adoption of measures (the ~~execution of~~ diversions) for the execution of which Arab states other than the UAR will be primarily responsible. For his "Arab Statesmanship" in accomplishing this, he earned praise which has put his prestige higher than for some time. For the time being, his tactics seem to be to exercise this renewed mandate of leadership through the Arab League and by preserving the "unity of purpose" of ~~cross~~ independent Arab states, relegating the doctrines of Arab socialism and "union"

"union" to the background, ~~In retrospect,~~ the Jordan waters question appears to have been ~~only~~ of secondary interest to those participating in the meeting; they were much more interested in inter-Arab affairs and inter-Arab disputes. The discordant note ~~was~~ struck by ~~Syrian propaganda~~ asking the awkward question: what are the Arabs going to do when Israel diverts the Jordan this year? and drawing attention to the absence of any clear answer.

at least for the time being IN Jerusalem

the Syrians at the conference and is now repeated in their propaganda, by

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No. 1362
January 28, 1964

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D. 3.58 p.m. January 28, 1964

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/4. Military Action.

4. Military Action. Damascus telegram No. 21 does not exclude the possibility of a Syrian military initiative but other posts report that the military command is solely intended for defence against Israel attack and confirm that no general military initiative is contemplated.

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